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IMPROVING NEGOTIATORS' COGNITIVE PROCESSES
Abstract
Researchers are beginning to develop a cognitive perspective on
negotiations that treats negotiators as problem solvers who are prone to
various errors and biases. We explore one important type of negotiator
error -- the tendency to ignore the way the opponent thinks about the
negotiation problem -- and examine ways to overcome this error and thus
improve negotiator performance. A series of studies investigates
incentives and training packages focusing on concrete examples and general
principles. The results show dramatic improvements in performance due to
clearer instructions, and modest success for the training packages,
although many people give the right answer for the wrong reasons. Only
those subjects with a combination of at least three economics courses and
the training package were able to achieve a high level of performance
similar to that of professional bankers.
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Economic analyses of negotiation situations assume that sufficiently
informed and motivated negotiators will reach optimal solutions to a
negotiation problem: a Pareto optimal solution when a "zone of agreement"
exists, and no agreement when such a zone does not exist. In contrast,
empirical research on negotiations has revealed numerous instances in
which negotiators fail to identify readily-apparent solutions, reach
agreement when none should exist, or reach suboptimal solutions (e.g.,
Bazerman, 1990; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986).
In this paper, we adopt a cognitive perspective to explicate one
important type of negotiator error: the tendency to ignore the way the
opponent thinks about the negotiation problem. In a series of
experiments, we couple our understanding of the sources of this error with
manipulations intended to improve negotiator performance. We view the
development and testing of training procedures as one way to promote both
stronger theories of negotiation and improved negotiation practices that
can potentially enhance societal well-being.
Negotiator Cognitions
Researchers are beginning to develop a cognitive perspective on
negotiations that treats negotiators as problem solvers. Within this
perspective, a growing list of errors and biases distinguish human
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performance from the economic "ideal," accompanied by a slowly-developing
body of theory to explain behavior. It has been shown that negotiators
may fail to reach efficient agreements because: (1) they are overconfident
that their side is correct and would be chosen by an arbitrator (Neale &
Bazerman, 1983), (2) they feel committed to a previous course of action
and escalate their commitment in order to justify their current stance in
the conflict (Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Staw, 1976, 1981), (3) the costs of
settling are more salient than the costs of holding out (Neale, 1984),
(4) the negotiation is "framed" as losses rather than as gains (Bazerman,
Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985), and (5) they presume a "fixed-pie" or zero-sum
situation and therefore fail to detect integrative potential (Thompson &
Hastie, 1988).
Bazerman and Carroll (1987) suggest that an understanding of
negotiators that would illuminate these anomalous outcomes requires the
concept of limited rationality and attention to the cognitive processes of
negotiators. Individuals' cognitive processes mediate the effect of
context and information on negotiation. In short, negotiators'
performances are determined by the way they interpret and analyze
negotiation situations, and by the cognitive skills they have for
identifying appropriate responses and strategies.
Thus, some of the shortcomings of negotiations (in comparison to the
normative economic model) are the outcomes of deficient analyses of the
negotiation situation arising from errors and biases on the part of the
negotiators. Research shows that greater success in achieving individual
and joint profits accrues to negotiators who are better able to understand
the opponent's priorities (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), see the negotiation
situation from the opponent's perspective and thus have realistic
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aspirations (Neale & Bazerman, 1983), and correctly estimate the amount of
resources to be divided (Thompson & Hastie, in press).
The Acquiring a Company Task
Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) found that negotiators under an
information disadvantage deviate from normative behavior by ignoring the
information available to the opponent and, consequently, fall prey to the
"winner's curse" -- they voluntarily enter into loss-making purchases. In
one study, subjects have an opportunity to make one bid (take it or leave
it) for the acquisition of a company (the full problem is provided in
Appendix 1). As potential acquirers, subjects know only that the company
is equally likely to be worth any value between $0 and $100 per share and
that, whatever its value, it is worth 50% more to the acquirer than to the
target owner. They also are told that the target owner knows the exact
value of the company and will accept any bid at or above that value. What
should the acquirer bid?
The majority of subjects bid within a perceived bargaining zone of
$50-$75, which presumes that the stock has an expected value to the target
of $50/share, and an expected value to the acquirer (themselves) of
$75/share. However, an informed target will only accept offers if they
are profitable. For example, if the seller accepts an offer of $60/share,
then the firm must be worth between $0 and $60/share. On average, the
firm would be worth $30/share to the target, and $45/share to the
acquirer. Therefore, the acquiror should expect to receive less than the
offer of $60/share! For any accepted offer, on average, the acquirer can
expect to obtain a company worth 25% less than the price it paid. Thus,
the acquirer's best offer is $0/share, or no offer. Yet, fewer than 10%
of subjects correctly bid $0.
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At one level, these findings can be taken as evidence of a systematic
bias unique to competitive situations under asymmetric information: the
exclusion of the contingency that the opponent has access to key
information and thus selectively accepts offers. Samuelson and Bazerman
proposed a stronger argument, however, that individuals in competitive
situations make simplifying assumptions that deviate from normative logic
about the decision patterns of opponents in order to make the task
cognitively more manageable.
Additional research using variations of this prototypical "errors and
biases" task has provided further evidence of the robustness of the
phenomenon and explication of the underlying errors of reasoning.
Carroll, Bazerman, and Maury (1988) used a variation of the problem in
which college student subjects had an opportunity to buy a used car that
has a value known only to the seller of between $0 and $1000 (buyer only
knows that all values are equally likely) and is worth 50% more to the
buyer. In order to determine what reasoning processes were being used,
each subject was instructed to "think aloud" into a tape recorder as they
determined their answer.
Consistent with the results of Samuelson and Bazerman, only 11% of
subjects correctly answered $0, and 52% answered between $500 and $750.
The analysis of the verbal protocols supported the suggested reasoning
processes of these two groups of subjects: correct subjects almost always
developed a generalized argument about the likely contingent behavior of
the seller, whereas incorrect subjects rarely did this. Correct subjects
also recognized that they did not have to buy the car unless it would be a
profitable transaction. Incorrect subjects often created a false
objective (e.g., "I want to make sure that I get the car") or assumed they
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knew the value of the car (e.g., "The car is very old, so I don't think it
would be worth more than 200 or 300").
It has been argued that failures such as the above will be eliminated
by proper incentives to encourage sufficient analysis (e.g., Smith, 1982)
and by learning from feedback (Kagel & Levin, 1986). Although markets can
"learn" over time as losers exit from the market, individuals may not
easily overcome judgmental distortions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). For
example, Ball, Bazerman, and Carroll (1990) created a computerized
multitrial version of the Acquiring a Company problem in which individual
Master's student subjects bid for the company, whose price was then
randomly generated, and the result (buy the company with a gain or loss,
or not buy the company) was immediately displayed, including changes to
their supply of funds (which had real cash equivalents). After 20 trials,
only 5 of 69 subjects had learned to bid $0.
The incorrect reasoning demonstrated above is a natural response to a
complex situation that leads to incorrect responses. Disregarding the
information asymmetry between the two parties is a simplification of the
confusing problem that occurs naturally for "cognitive misers" (Abelson &
Levi, 1985; Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Nor does performance seem to be
correlated with various personality measures (Halpern, 1989). In order to
produce better performance, we will have to improve the reasoning
underlying basic negotiation skills.
Teaching Reasoning
Although human reasoning capabilities are limited (e.g., Simon, 1957),
it should be possible to identify specific deficiencies in reasoning and
to remedy them through education or information aids. Fischhoff (1982)
lists various ways of "debiasing" decision makers, stressing practice with
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specific and relevant tasks, task-specific reinforcement, and "explicit
admission of the need for learning" (p. 443). He suggests that warnings,
descriptions of the deficiencies, personalized feedback, and extensive
training can provide correctives to initial inaccuracies in judgment.
Specific training seems to work better than general information, although
it is not clear whether subjects learn specific responses or more
transferrable general skills.
Nisbett and his colleagues have had some success teaching statistical
reasoning and other forms of abstract thinking (Lehman, Lempert, &
Nisbett, 1988). Nisbett, Fong, Lehman, and Cheng (1987) and Fong, Krantz,
and Nisbett (1986) found that some forms of statistics training were
effective in teaching logical reasoning, and in the application of
statistical thinking to various domains. Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and
Oliver (1986) review evidence that people can use statistical reasoning
when the problem contains cues that encourage the use of statistical
heuristics.
The key problem seems to be transfer, generalizability, or application
of principles learned on one problem to other problems. As Raiffa (1984)
pointed out, his students used appropriate decision strategies on an exam
only when they realized that Raiffa was the author of the test questions,
and thus were cued into recalling relevant strategies. In a series of
studies, Holyoak and his colleagues (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1988; Gick &
Holyoak, 1983; Holyoak & Koh, 1987) showed that the use of analogies
depends on cues to retrieve relevant comparison contexts, and cues to
permit transfer of the problem-solution schema to the new context. This
may require a combination of feature similarities, multiple prior
examples, and direct instruction to look for similarities.
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Our objective, in the series of studies described in this paper, is to
improve performance on the Acquiring a Company problem. Although the
choice of any single context raises the question of generalizability, it
would seem that success in eliminating bias on this specific problem would
be an important first step toward the teaching of reasoning skills
necessary for good negotiation. If we are to improve negotiation
reasoning skills, then we must understand: (1) the nature of "proper"
reasoning, (2) the sources of errors and biases, and (3) the techniques
for teaching reasoning.
Proper reasoning. Normative theory implies that good performance on
the Acquiring a Company task requires that the negotiator recognize the
stated goal of profit maximization, perceive the value of the company to
both parties, understand the target's contingent rule (sell only if the
price is high enough) and the implications for the value of the purchased
company, and combine this information in a concrete or abstract version of
expected utility. By a concrete version of utility, we refer to specific
hypothetical examples such as what would happen if a bid of $60 was
accepted, or partial analyses such as the recognition that the probability
of losing is double the probability of winning. An abstract version would
be formally reasoned in the manner of game theory; such analysis should be
sufficient but not necessary for good performance.
Errors and biases. Carroll et al. (1988) have shown that errors and
biases arise from misstated goals, intrusions of external knowledge into
the task that override task information, and failure to recognize the
contingent behavior of the opponent. Applying the analyses of sources of
error in Fischhoff (1982) and Grether and Plott (1979), these phenomena
themselves are due to features of the task (confusing instructions, time
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pressure), features of the negotiators (limited information processing,
lack of motivation), and combinations of personal and task features
(familiarity with the specific materials and the task, Rogoff, Gauvain, &
Ellis, 1984).
The studies described in this paper directly or indirectly address
these sources of error. In regard to task features, all studies use
instructions and task descriptions that avoid sources of confusion. Since
subjects may naturally assume they are supposed to bid something, our
instructions include language to legitimate a $0 offer and thus avoid
subtle demand of an offer above $0. In regard to features of the
negotiators, Study 1 uses monetary incentives to affect motivation to do
systematic analytical thinking. Prior knowledge is varied in several ways
across the studies, including numbers of courses in economics, statistics,
decision making, and bargaining/negotiation, and the use of experienced
middle managers and bankers in Study 4. Grade point average, standardized
test scores, and major are also used to examine general knowledge (or
intelligence).
Training techniques. Of central interest are effective techniques for
imparting negotiation skills, or the reasoning necessary for skilled
negotiation. Nisbett and his colleagues have suggested that statistical
reasoning and general logical reasoning can be taught by using a
combination of abstract principles and multiple concrete examples, with
specific feedback directed'at the learner (Nisbett et al., 1987). i{olyoak
and his colleagues suggest that more shared features across contexts and
instructions to induce a more general problem-schema from examples or
hints (reminders) about the applicability of prior solutions enhance
transfer of knowledge (e.g., Catrambone & Holyoak, 1988).
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Studies 2 and 3 use "training packages" consisting of two examples
with explanations and general principles derived from our understanding of
correct and incorrect reasoning (Carroll et al., 1988). Variations of the
training package use examples that share more features with the "target"
Acquiring a Company task. A variety of reminders or hints are also
included.
Study 1: Monetary Incentives
Economists criticize psychological studies revealing errors and biases
by arguing that participants lack motivation to do better (e.g., Grether &
Plott, 1979; Smith, 1982). Despite repeated demonstrations that monetary
payments fail to improve performance substantially, it seems necessary to
investigate whether subjects care enough to do their best. In Study 1,
business school Master's students (who presumably care a lot about both
money and their egos) are given the Acquiring a Company problem under
baseline conditions or monetary incentives for correct performance.
Method
Subjects were 83 first-year Master's students in two Marketing
courses, 17 of whom were dropped from further analysis because they
reported familiarity with the Acquiring a Company problem. The study was
run during class time. Subjects in the Control or baseline condition were
given an improved version of the Acquiring a Company problem that involved
shortened instructions and wording emphasizing that the subjects did not
have to make an offer: "It is not necessary for Company A to make an
offer; there are no negative consequences for recommending no offer."
Further, the response was made in two-question format: a yes/no
recommendation of an offer, and, if yes, a specific dollar per share
offer. Appendix 2 gives the complete problem and instructions. Control
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subjects merely handed back their forms anonymously.
Subjects in the High Motivation condition were told that we had a way
to evaluate performance, and then permitted to choose their preferred
incentive for good performance: $10 in cash or a lottery with a 10%
chance of winning $100. This choice was intended to enhance the value of
the incentive, and to assess risk attitudes. The lottery was determined
by their choice of a number from 0 to 9, checked against the first digit
of the Massachusetts State Lottery on a specified day one week later.
Students in this condition listed their name and address; winners were
paid by mail after the Lottery date. In addition to giving their answers,
all subjects were asked to give their reasoning, and to provide background
information about themselves.
The reasons given for responses were analyzed with a seven-category
coding system that was a modified version of the coding system developed
by Carroll et al. (1988). The categories were: (1) no explanation -
guess, unintelligible; (2) good logic - including numerical analysis or
recognition of greater likelihood and magnitude of losses over gains; (3)
intuitive logic - recognizing information asymmetry, risk of loss; (4)
wrong goal - wanting to buy the company; (5) bad logic - ignoring seller's
information, assuming expected value of $50; (6) focus on gain - 50%
profit, risk seeking; and (7) focus on loss - risk averse, worst case.
Results and Discussion
In the Control condition, only 3 of 28 subjects (11%) got the correct
answer) corresponding quite closely to the results of Samuelson and
Bazerman, and Carroll et. al. In the High Motivation condition, 9 of 38
(24%) of subjects got the correct answer. The difference between the
conditions is not significant [X2(1)=1.8, <.2], providing only slight
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evidence that stronger motivation can improve performance; performance in
the High Motivation condition is still quite disappointing. There was no
apparent difference in the rate of correct answers among those in the
reward condition choosing to work for a sure $10 as opposed to those who
chose the lottery.
Notice that the High Motivation condition had three reasons to do
better than the controls: (1) the chance of earning money, (2) the
association of their name with their answers, engaging more self-esteem
maintenance, and (3) information that the correct answer is not merely a
matter of opinion. It is possible but unproven that still more money
could increase performance somewhat on the Acquiring a Company problem,
presumably by stimulating more effort and avoidance of "clear errors" (Cox
& Isaac, 1986).
An examination of the reasons given for justification of answers
showed that there was little improvement in the quality of reasoning in
the incentive condition. The proportion of reasons showing good logic in
the Control condition was 0%, compared to 5% in the Incentives condition.
The proportion exhibiting intuitive logic (recognizing the possibility of
loss, worst case loss, or information asymmetry) was 7% and 11%,
respectively. Interestingly, the proportion who focused on monetary
risks, seeming to seek the possibility of gain or to avoid losses, was 7%
in the Control condition and 24% in the Incentives condition. Thus, if
anything, the effect of incentives was to generate a concern with money in
terms of risk attitudes rather than normative logic. Note, however, that
the overall relationship of reasons and experimental condition was
nonsignificant recombining small cells, X2(3)=5.1, p<.2].
Since the improvement in performance was so modest, we chose to
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explore training strategies as the aspect of cognition over which
researchers have the greatest direct control.
Study 2: The First Training Package
The work of Nisbett and Holyoak shows that reasoning can be taught
through a combination of didactic principles and examples. The key issue
is not to teach specific responses to a particular problem, but to convey
the perceptual and reasoning processes necessary to handle new
situations. Such transfer of training requires that people recognize the
nature of new problems and apply the principles and analogies that have
been learned.
Study 2 consists of three separate sub-studies in which somewhat
different populations of subjects were given the Acquiring a Company
problem with or without a training package. The training package was
designed to teach the principles necessary to answer correctly the
Acquiring a Company problem: (1) the goal of maximizing expected value,
(2) careful attention to all the information given in the problem, and (3)
informal analysis of contingencies producing an intuitive version of a
decision tree for assessing expected outcomes. This training stressed
that contingencies must be viewed from the other party's viewpoint as well
as one's own: you must assess what the other party knows and wants in
order to predict his or her responses. The principles were explicitly
stated and exemplified by two problems: the Used Car problem and the Jade
Dragon problem.
In the Used Car problem, adapted from Samuelson and Bazerman (1985),
subjects were asked to recommend a course of action for a friend who is
considering buying a used car. According to a mechanic, there is a 0%
chance that the car has a particular engine problem. That problem would
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make the car worth $300 to both the current owner and the buyer. However,
if it does not have this problem, it would be worth $600 to the owner but
$1300 to your friend (because of a local tax and commuting situation).
The current owner knows whether the engine problem is present or not, but
the buyer cannot know until the car is bought. The procedure involves
only one offer, and the owner will accept the offer if it is higher than
the value of the car to him, and reject it otherwise, in which case there
is no opportunity to raise the offer. The subjects are asked what they
would recommend as a bid for the car.
After subjects make their recommended bid, the training materials
explain that the correct answer is to offer $600, since it maximizes their
expected benefit: they always get the car, which 50% of the time is worth
$300 (lose $300) and 50% of the time is worth $1300 (gain $700). Offers
over $600 only result in more profit to the owner and loss to the buyer;
offers between $301 and $599 can only buy the $300 car at a loss; offers
below $300 never get taken; an offer of $300, although reasonable because
it obtains a $300 car 50% of the time, foregoes the opportunity to get a
good deal on the car if it does not have the engine problem. It is
further emphasized that the goal is to make the best decision in this
situation so as to maximize the expected outcomes. Subjects are told that
they should not assume that it is possible to guess whether or not the car
has the problem; the uncertainty is an integral part of this situation.
For simplicity, these explanations ignore risk attitudes; we recognize
that extreme risk avoiders would want to offer either $300 or $0, but this
seemed an unreasonable complication.
In the Jade Dragon problem, subjects are asked to imagine that they
are visiting a foreign country and are offered a jade figurine for sale in
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a market place. They know that such art objects vary a lot in quality,
and believe it to be worth at least $50, but possibly up to $300.
Whatever it is worth to the dealer, it is worth 60% more in the U.S. The
dealer has told them to make one offer, take it or leave it. If the offer
is more than its value to the dealer, then he will sell; otherwise he will
not sell and the offer cannot be raised. Subjects are asked what they
would bid if they want to do well and do not want to risk losing money on
the deal (notice that this goal is not the same as maximizing expected
value). Again, after making their offer, subjects read an analysis
arguing that an offer of $80 gives them some potential for profit and
ensures that they cannot lose money since the jade must be worth at least
$50 to the dealer and, adding 60%, $80 to themselves.
Following the two problems, the principles of goal, information, and
analysis from multiple viewpoints are again emphasized. The subjects are
then given the Acquiring a Company problem.
Notice that the structures of these problems are similar but not
identical. The Used Car problem is discrete (the car has just two
possible values) rather than continuous as in the Acquiring a Company
problem. The Jade Dragon problem has continuous values, but sets a
non-zero lower bound. Further, the goal of the Jade Dragon problem is not
to maximize expected utility (a complex calculation depending on unknown
risk attitudes) but to seek profit while avoiding loss (which gives a
fairly simple answer). All the problems share the asymmetry of
information -- the seller knows the value of the object while the buyer
does not, the single take-it-or-leave-it bidding procedure, and the
generic context of a buyer and seller, but differ in the surface context
of what is for sale. The training package is therefore teaching
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principles rather than a particular answer (ie., avoiding all situations
where the seller knows more than you is hardly a proper response).
Study 2a: College Students
Method. 74 undergraduates, mostly engineering majors, took part. 30
were randomly assigned to a Control condition in which they first did the
Acquiring a Company problem. Upon completion and collection of answers,
they were handed a summary of the general principles (but no examples) and
a second copy of the Acquiring a Company problem to complete. The
remaining 44 subjects received a training package in which they saw the
Acquiring a Company problem, but were asked to delay answering until after
they read the remaining materials, which were the Jade Dragon, the Used
Car, and the summary of general principles. In all conditions, subjects
were asked directly for their bid, with the statement that a $0 bid was
equivalent to no bid.
Results and discussion. 14 of 30 subjects (47%) in the Control
condition gave the correct answer on their first try, compared to 22 of 44
(50%) in the Training condition [X2(1)=0.1, n.s.]. On thir second try, 20
of 30 Control subjects (67%) gave the correct answer, with 7 of 16
originally incorrect subjects changing to the right answer, and 1 of 14
originally correct subjects changing to a wrong answer [X2(1)=5.1,
p<.05]. This suggests that answering the problem a second time following
presentation of principles acts like effective training on the same
problem. The training package (training on different problems) had no
apparent effect, although baseline performance was already dramatically
higher than previously encountered.
Examining the reasons given for answers, and dropping categories with
too few responses, there were few differences between the reasons given
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with and without training (X2(4)=4.4, n.s.). Although typical bad logic
fell from 23% to 11%, good logic was also less frequent, changing from 13%
to 7%. The proportion of intuitively correct reasons rose from 40% to
52%, and the proportion of reasons relating to risk-seeking rose from 3%
to 7%.
Study 2b: First-Year Master's Students
Method. Subjects were 48 Master's students enrolled in an elective
course in group behavior in organizations, 4 of whom were dropped from the
analysis after reporting familiarity with the problem. As part of the
course, students had experienced considerable work in negotiation and
role-taking. 15 of the subjects were randomly assigned to a Control
condition in which they completed the Acquiring a Company problem, then
read a full training package consisting of the Used Car problem, the Jade
Dragon problem, each with detailed feedback, and a summary of general
principles, and finally made a second try at the Acquiring a Company
problem. A second condition with 14 subjects received the training
package and the problem only at the end. A third condition with 15
subjects received the same training package but a modified Acquiring a
Company problem that was intended to be simpler and more concrete. As was
the case in Study 2a, the response format employed a single question ("How
much would you offer for the stock?").
Results and discussion. 4 of 15 Control subjects (27%) were correct
in their first taking of the Acquiring a Company problem, compared with 7
of 14 (50%) in the Training condition, and 9 of 15 (60%) in the
Training-Simplified condition. Pooling the two Training conditions, the
training package had a marginally significant effect [X2(1) = 3.2,
p<.10]. On the second taking in the Control condition, 6 of 15 subjects
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(44%) were correct; 2 of 11 initially incorrect subjects now gave correct
answers, and all 4 initially correct subjects repeated their answer (too
few responses to test).
In parallel with the modestly successful results above, analysis of
the reasons given for answers showed some suggestive differences between
the Control and Training groups [X2(4)=7.6, <.15]. In the Control
condition, only 7% of subjects offered reasons exhibiting good logic,
compared to 24% of those in the Training conditions. 20% of subjects
offered intuitively correct reasons in the Control condition, compared to
21% in the Training conditions. The typical errors of wrong goal and bad
logic dropped from 14% and 20% to 0% and 10%, respectively. It seems that
the training package did have some impact on performance, although the
small numbers of subjects in each condition provide a weak test.
Study 2c: Second-Year Master's Students
Method. 40 second-year master's students from an advanced Marketing
class participated during class time. 4 students who reported familiarity
with the problem were dropped from further analysis. Second-year students
have had considerably more coursework in economics, statistics, and other
material that may enhance performance. 17 students were randomly assigned
to a Control condition in which they simply solved the Acquiring a Company
problem, and then did a second unrelated task so the groups would finish
at the same time. The remaining 19 students completed a training package
consisting of the Used Car, Jade Dealer, and summary principles prior to
the Acquiring a Company problem. Further, in contrast to Studies 2a and
2b, this study used a two-question format ("Would you make an offer?" and
"If you decided to make an offer, how much...?"). This format was
intended to further legitimate the no-offer option.
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Results and discussion. 9 of 17 students (53%) in the Control
condition got the correct answer, compared to 9 of 19 (47%) in the
Training condition [X2(1)=0.1, n.s.]. Nor were there any significant
differences in the reasons given for answers, with 24% giving good logic
in the Control condition, compared to 21% in the Training condition
[X2(3)=0.8, n.s.].
It is interesting to consider the relatively large differences in
baseline performance between the undergraduates in Study 2a (47%), the
first-year Master's students in Study 2b (27%), and the second-year
Master's students in Study 2c (53%). These studies differed not only in
the subject populations, but also in the use of one or two questions for
eliciting bids. Some of these factors will be addressed in the internal
analysis following the reports of individual experiments.
The training package used in Study 2 was not noticeably successful,
although there were some suggestive results in Study 2b. In fact, the
most dramatic result of Study 2 was the performance of the Control
condition in comparison to the 10% correct responses usually obtained.
Highly quantitative undergraduates and second-year Master's students
achieved baseline perfomance of 50%, whereas first-year Master's students
were correct 25% of the time.
Study 3: The Second Training Package
In an effort to beef up the training package, we modified the training
package by creating a simple and concrete training problem called the
Wallet problem. Imagine I have one bill in my wallet, and it is either a
$1, $5, or $10 bill. It is equally likely to be any one of the three.
You make one bid, and if your bid is equal to or higher than the value of
the bill, I will give you the bill plus 50%, in exchange for your bid. If
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your bid is lower, then you do not get the bill. It is easy to show that
the correct bid to maximize expected gain is $1, and it is a concrete and
visualizable situation, a discrete version of the Acquiring a Company
problem. In a second version of this, called Wallet-0, it is made more
similar to the Acquiring a Company problem by introducing the possibility
that there is no bill in the wallet, making $0, $1, $5, and $10 equally
likely, and making a bid of $0 the correct answer. Since the Wallet-0O
problem shares more features with the Acquiring a Company problem
(Catrambone & Holyoak, 1988), it should encourage better performance.
Method
105 Master's students participated during class time from two
first-year courses and one second-year course at two management schools.
4 of these subjects were eliminated after they reported prior experience
with the Acquiring a Company problem. The remaining 101 subjects were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions: (1) Control, in which
subjects first tried the Acquiring a Company problem, then received
Wallet-0, Jade Dragon, summary principles, and finally a second try at the
Acquiring a Company problem; (2) Training#1l, in which subjects received
the training package of Jade Dragon, Wallet-l, summary principles, and
then Acquiring a Company; and (3) Training#2, in which subjects received
Wallet-0, Jade Dragon, summary principles, and Acquiring a Company. All
subjects were asked to respond using the two-question format.
Results
19 of 31 Control subjects (61%) were correct, in comparison to 23 of
33 in Training#l (70%) and 31 of 37 in Training#2 (84%). The differences
among the three conditions are suggestive [X2(2)=4.4, p<.15]. Control
subjects did no better after the training package: two subjects
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switched from incorrect answers to the correct answer, and two switched
from correct answers to incorrect ones.
Examining the reasons given for the responses offers a different
story. Only 10% of subjects gave the correct reasoning in the Control
condition, and only 6% in Training#l with the Wallet-1 problem. However,
in Training#2 with the Wallet-0 problem, 22% of subjects provided the
correct reasoning. Overall reason frequencies among the three conditions
were significantly different [X2(8)=16.1, <.05]. Additionally, a major
impact of the training packages was to increase references to
risk-aversion or concern about losses. Only 6% of subjects mentioned
their fear of losing money in the Control condition, but 14% in the
Wallet-O condition and 33% in the Wallet-1 condition mentioned it.
Apparently, the training packages were good at scaring people as well as
teaching logical reasoning!
Study 4: Highly-Experienced Participants
It is reasonable to assume that highly-trained people in careers that
require considerable economic and financial sophistication, and the use of
negotiation skills, should do better at negotiation tasks than students.
As Neale and Northcraft (1987) point out, laboratory tasks give students
little opportunity to demonstrate task-specific expertise, but realistic
materials can evoke a richer set of strategic possibilities in experienced
negotiators. In Study 4a, we examine the performance of experienced
managers attending a week-long management seminar. In Study 4b, we
examine the performance of investment bankers, a rather select population
that should be at the pinnacle of skill, because the Acquiring a Company
problem is close to their professional domain. Study 4a also provided an
opportunity to examine the performance of two-person groups asked to
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produce a joint answer to the problem.
Study 4a: Managers
Method. One of the exercises of a week-long management seminar was
meant to demonstrate the effectiveness and pitfalls of group decision
making. 30 middle and upper managers from various companies took part.
Each completed three problems individually, of which Acquiring a Company
was the third and by far the most difficult. Responses were elicited
using the two-question format. The managers then sorted themselves into
pairs, which discussed each problem until they could provide a group
answer.
Results and Discussion. 12 of the 30 subjects (40%) got the correct
answer the first time. After dyadic group discussion, 9 of 15 groups
(60%) were correct. In six pairs that began with two incorrect answers,
two wound up correct (33%). In six pairs that began with one right
answer, four wound up correct (67%), one incorrect, and one could not
reach a consensus. In the remaining three pairs that began with two
correct answers, all three remained correct.
It is interesting to note that initial performance is far from
perfect, suggesting that general managerial experience is not sufficient
to improve performance on the Acquiring a Company problem. The ability of
those with correct answers to win more than their share (but not all) of
the arguments over those with incorrect answers is consistent with studies
of group decision making (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986; Maier & Solem, 1962).
Study 4b: Bankers
Method. The alumni lists of a management school were used to provide
100 Master's graduates who had taken jobs in investment banking. A
graduation date between 1 and 12 years prior was required, so that
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subjects would have some actual work experience. The Acquiring a Company
problem was mailed individually to each person, along with a cover letter
and a return envelope. Responses were elicited using the two-question
format.
One enterprising subject sent back a response and a letter asking
whether she could give the problem to her colleagues at work. Additional
forms were mailed to her, and she returned a substudy of bankers from a
single bank.
Results and discussion. 36 of the original 100 mailed problems were
returned. Of these, 30 were correct (83%). This represents a ceiling of
83% performance if the 36 returns are representative of all bankers,
assuming the non-respondents were too busy or lacked interest, rather than
that they tried, knew they failed, and therefore did not respond. The
floor would be 30%, assuming the non-respondents were all wrong. The
substudy in a single bank supports the first explanation, since the
fledgling researcher gave out and received back 7 copies, of which 7 were
correct. This strongly suggests that bankers, with their specific
training and real-world experience, do quite well on the task. Of course,
there are still a detectable proportion who fail to see the structure of
this problem.
Internal Analyses
Although occasional effects of training are discernable, the strongest
differences appear to be among the populations that we sampled, ranging
from the 40 or 50% performance of Master's students to the 80% performance
of bankers. In order to identify what accounts for these differences
among individuals, and to examine any interactions between individual
characteristics and training, we turn to an examination of background data
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collected from the college and Master's student subjects.
Method
In Studies 1, 2, and 3, subjects were asked to fill out a personal
information form after completing the Acquiring a Company problem. In
order to examine the effects of training in conjunction with background
variables, with maximum statistical power, the data from Studies 2 and 3
were combined. Data from Study 1 were dropped because the manipulation
had used incentives rather than training. Study 4 did not collect
background information.
The background information consisted of gender, age, major, grade
point average, college board scores (GMATs were requested, but many
subjects gave GRE or SAT scores; raw scores were converted to
percentiles), and numbers of courses taken in economics, statistics,
decision making, and bargaining/negotiation. We also created a variable
measuring whether the response was obtained in the one-question or
two-question format.
We considered the possibility that different background variables
might interact with the training package than would affect performance in
the Control condition, and that those Control subjects who change their
responses in a second try at the same problem are engaged in a different
task from those who are answering the problem for the first time. We
therefore conducted three separate analyses: (1) Control or baseline
condition performance, to examine the effects of prior learning; (2)
performance in conditions that received training, to examine the ability
to learn; and (3) performance among those subjects who gave an incorrect
response in a Control condition, then received training, and had a second
opportunity to answer the same problem, as a second measure of the ability
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to learn.
Results
Due to considerable missing data, the initial analyses examined
variables related to correct answers in bivariate tests, and then used
variables significant at p<.15 or better in multivariate models.
Control condition performance. Initially, significant or marginally
significant relationships with performance were found for economics
courses [r(107)=.17, p<.05], response format [r(121)=.11, <.15], decision
making courses [r(93)=-.28, p<.01], and quantitative test scores
[r(78)=-.13, p<.15]. Better performance was associated with more
economics courses, the two-question format, fewer decision making courses,
and lower test scores.
Discriminant analysis using these four variables showed that only
decision making courses and economics courses had significant effects on
performance (p<.01 and p<.10 respectively). From notes written on the
questionnaire, we observed that many students counted courses such as
Linear Programming as decision making, so this is not necessarily an
indictment of behavioral decision theory courses. The tendency for lower
quantitative test scores or the two-question format to be associated with
correct answers was undetectable after accounting for the other variables.
Training condition performance. Three variables were significant or
marginally significant in predicting trained performance: number of
economics courses [r(154)=.15, p<.05], number of statistics courses
[r(154)=.11, p<.lO, and question format [r(161)=.10, p=.10]. In the
discriminant analysis, only number of economics courses remained
significant (p<.10).
Second try performance. Despite the small number of subjects who had
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an opportunity to improve their performance on the same problem, five
variables were significant or marginally significant as predictors of
post-training responses: verbal standardized test scores [r(21)=.48,
p<.05], quantitative scores [r(22)=.30, p<.10], grade point average
[r(24)=.26, <.15], number of bargaining/negotiation courses [r(25)=-.28,
p<.10J, and number of economics courses [r(33)=-.25, p<.10]. In the
discriminant analysis, only verbal test scores remained significant as a
predictor of second-try performance (<.05), with higher verbal scores
associated with better performance. This pattern of correlates suggests
that learning after an initial try at a problem is different from learning
without the initial trial.
Combining training types. Table 1 presents the combined impact of
economics courses and training conditions on responses (not including
second-try responses). This time, however, responses have been divided
into correct with good logic, correct with other than good logic, and
incorrect with other than good logic (one case of incorrect with good
logic was dropped). Differences among levels of training and performance
(answer and reasons) are highly significant [X2(6)=25.8, p<.001].
Insert Table 1
Subjects with neither substantial economics background nor exposure to
our training packages are correct 35% of the time, but only 9% have good
logic. Our various training packages raise this to 57% correct, but still
only 9% express good logic in their reasons. Thus, the disappointing
conclusion is that the training packages are able to teach proper
performance on the Acquiring a Company Problem, but apparently for the
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wrong reasons. Generally, the reasons given for a $0 bid are risk
avoidance or some vague sense that this is a bad situation.
Interestingly, subjects with economics training (three or more
courses) who were in our control conditions perform at about the same
level as those with no economics training who received our training
package. 62% of control subjects with economics training give the correct
answer, but only 10% offer good logical reasons. This again suggests an
incomplete understanding that might not generalize to other situations.
Most hopeful, however, is that subjects with economics training and our
training package are correct 71% of the time, and 25% of these subjects
express good reasons. This is the only case in which good reasoning shows
up at rates above 10%. It is possible, of course, that subjects who
answer correctly but give other reasons have learned some important
lessons, and may have learned proper reasoning but are unable to express
their reasons. If so, we would conclude that our training package was
successful, and approximately equivalent to three economics courses.
General Discussion
Training Better Performance
The results of the series of studies is an example of "good news, bad
news." The most obvious and dramatic good news is that performance on the
Acquiring a Company problem, which previous research reported at 10%
correct answers, has increased in some conditions to between 50% and 80%.
The other side of this news, however, is that the increase is not wholly
attributable to the training packages that were designed to teach general
reasoning principles. Instead, much of the improvement is due to the
following:
(a) The instructions and description of the problem were simplified
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and clarified;
(b) Implicit demand characteristics that subjects make an offer have
been counteracted by explicit statements and, in some cases, by a
two-question response procedure. In fact, it might be argued that some of
the increase in correct answering is due to demand in the opposite
direction -- subjects may perceive a hint that they avoid buying the
company. Question format does have a marginally-significant correlation
with performance, but this disappears when number of economics courses is
controlled;
(c) More sophisticated subjects were used. Specifically, these were
highly intelligent and quantitatively-adept students from top-rated
management schools and undergraduates from a top-rated engineering and
science school. At least some had background in economics that had
demonstrable impact; and
(d) Most subjects who gave correct bids did not give correct logical
reasons. This suggests that the "lessons" learned and the high level of
performance probably would not transfer to other tasks with similar
structure (ie., where understanding the opponent's viewpoint matters). It
supports the argument of implicit demand producing right answers for the
wrong reasons.
However, we have demonstrated that the training packages do work. On
average, they increase the correct responses by about 15%. Further, when
subjects already have an economics background of three or more courses,
the training package also increases correct responses by about 20%. Most
interesting of all, the most sensitive test of learning -- giving the
right answer and the right reasons -- shows that enhanced performance
occurs only for those students who have the economics background and
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receive the training package. On this measure, correct performance goes
from about 9% to 25%.
What is Learned?
Examining the various training packages, there is some evidence that
more concrete and understandable examples are more effective, and examples
that contain more specific similarities to the target problem are more
effective. For example, the Wallet problems seem to work better than the
Used Car problem. Further, the Wallet problem employing a zero answer
seemed somewhat better than the similar problem without a zero answer.
The former captures more of the structure of the Acquiring a Company
problem.
Of course, the issue is whether subjects learn a specific lesson about
bidding zero in this case, or whether they learn a general lesson about
the viewpoint of the opponent, goals, and decision trees. Analyses of the
reasons given for responses suggest that subjects tend to learn that there
are risks in the problems, or pick up the hint that a bid of $0 is
"safe." Only a small proportion of subjects offered reasons that
evidenced a generalizable understanding of the problem. Of course, it is
entirely possible that more subjects understood the proper reasoning, but
did not write it down (e.g., the written response "too risky" could be the
result of anything from intuition to formal analysis).
Better Ways to Train Negotiators
Although we attempted to create an effective learning environment,
employing a combination of specific examples and general principles, other
modalities for learning might be more effective. For example, more
personalized feedback directed at the subjects' specific answers could be
employed. Alternatively, subjects could be given more concrete experience
page 30
trying out their new skills. Or, subjects could be given a more concrete
learning experience about the perspective of the opponent.
One recent study has had some success employing computer-assisted
education to provide such learning experiences on the Acquiring a Company
task. Ball et al. (1990) conducted a follow-up to their study of subjects
playing a computerized game version of the Acquiring a Company problem.
In this study, one group of subjects was given 20 trials as the acquirer
and 20 trials as the target (to give practice in the opposite role) prior
to playing 20 trials as the acquirer on the next day, while a second group
of subjects had only prior practice as the acquirer. Those given "role
reversal" experience were significantly able to learn (percentage of
learners went from 9% on practice trials to 37%) whereas those given only
experience as acquirers showed nonsignificant learning (6% to 12%). This
suggests that concrete experience with different viewpoints, coupled with
immediate personalized feedback, is indeed helpful. However, the
experience and feedback were on the same task and may not generalize to
other negotiation situations. Further, nearly two-thirds of subjects
still gave wrong answers.
Prospects for Negotiation Practice
The results of this series of studies reiterates the difficulty of
training good negotiation skills. The mental heuristics, illusions, and
biases that are part of dealing with a complex world are ingrained and
hard to change. We further observe that subjects are very sensitive to
instructions and wording, and can be easily misled or subject to demand
characteristics.
A sound base of formal courses, such as economics, seems useful but
not sufficient. Such courses provide a foundation, but without specific
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further instruction and cues to application, they are not notably
successful in enhancing negotiation skills. Interestingly, there is
little evidence that formal courses in decision making (as defined by the
subjects and predominantly not behavioral in nature) or
bargaining/negotiation have much impact.
However, it is also apparent that learning does occur, and is enhanced
by clear instructions, repeated examples with personal application and
feedback, and features that are shared with situation to which
generalization is desired (such as the presence of a $0 possibility).
Master's students with three or more economics courses and exposure to our
training package gave correct answers over 70% of the time; this
approached the performance of a select group of bankers whose training and
real-world experience made them ideally suited to perform well.
Researchers should continue developing ways to teach negotiation
skills both as a means to improve negotiation practice, and as an
illuminating exercise for negotiation theory. New techniques, such as the
role-reversal and computerized-feedback study of Ball et al., should be
developed and explored. Extension to other aspects of decision making and
negotiation should also be sought.
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Table 1
Impact of Economics Courses and Training Packages on Performance
_________________________________________________________________________
Training
0-2 Econ/
No Training
0-2 Econ/
Training
3+ Econ/
No Training
3+ Econ/
Training
Answers and Logic
Correct Answer Incorrect Answer
Good Logic Weak Logic Weak Logic
7 (9)
9 (9)
3 (10)
13 (25)
20 (26)
49 (49)
15 (52)
24 (46)
51 (65)
43 (43)
11 (38)
15 (29)
Note - numbers in parentheses are percentages of row totals.
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Appendix 1: Original Instructions For Acquiring A Company Problem
In the following exercise you will represent Company A (the acquirer),
which is currently considering acquiring Company T (the target) by means
of a tender offer. You plan to tender in cash for 100% of Company T's
shares but are unsure how high a price to offer. The main complication is
this: the value of Company T depends directly on the outcome of a major
oil exploration project it is currently undertaking. Indeed, the very
viability of Company T depends on the exploration outcome. If the project
fails, the company under current management will be worth nothing --
$0/share. But if the project succeeds, the value of the company under
current management could be as high as $100/share. All share values
between $0 and $100 are considered equally likely. By all estimates, the
company will be worth considerably more in the hands of Company A than
under current management. In fact, whatever the ultimate value under
current management, the company will be worth fifty percent more under the
management of A than under Company T. If the project fails, the company
is worth $0/share under either management. If the exploration project
generates a $50/share value under current management, the value under
Comapany A is $75/share. Similarly, a $100/share value under Company T
implies a $150/share value under Company A, and so on.
The board of directors of Company A has asked you to determine the
price they should offer for Company T's shares. This offer must b made
now, before the outcome of the drilling project is know. From all
indications, Company T would be happy to be acquired by Company A,
provided it is at a profitable price. Moreover, Company T wishes o
avoid, at all cost, the potential of a takeover bid by any other firm.
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You expect Company T to delay a decision on your bid until the results of
the project are in, then accept or reject your offer before the news of
the drilling results reaches the press.
Thus, you (Company A) will not know the results of the exploration
project when submitting your price offer, but Company T will know the
results when deciding whether or not to accept your offer. In addition,
Company T is expected to accept any offer by Company A that is greater
than the (per share) value of the company under current management.
As the representative of Company A, you are deliberating over price
offers in the range SO/share (this is tantamount to making no offer at
all) to $150/share. What price offer per share would you tender for
Company T's stock?
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Appendix 2: Revised Instructions For Acquiring A Company Problem
You represent Company A. Your company currently is considering making
an offer to buy Company T. You are unsure how high an offer to recommend,
because the exact price per share of Company T is unknown to your company.
You only know that the value of Company T is somewhere between $0 and
$100 per share. The shares could be worth any value in this range and all
values are equally likely. However, whatever the value of Company T is
under its current management, it would be worth 50% more in your company's
hands (due to strategic fit and enlightened management). For example, if
Company T is worth $100/share under its current management, it would be
worth $150/share to Company A.
Company A can make only one offer for Company T. If the offer is
turned down, there will not be an opportunity to revise the offer. The
offer would be made without knowing the value of Company T. The
management of Company T, however, knows exactly its own value per share
when responding to an offer. They will accept any offer that is greater
than or equal to the price per share under current management; otherwise,
the offer will be rejected and there will not be another chance to bid.
You should not think of Company A as competing with other bidders to
acquire Company T.
As a representative of Company A, you are considering recommending
offers ranging from $0/share to $150/share. The goal of your company is
merely to get the highest expected benefit out of the deal, that is, to
make a good business decision. It is not necessary for Company A to make
an offer; there are no negative consequences for recommending no offer.
Would you recommend that Company A make an offer? YES NO
If yes, what offer per share would you recommend?
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